A DIGRESSION ON THE IMPERFECTION OF THE VIRTUES OF THE UNBELIEVERS[1]
Long ago wise men of ancient times made glorious discourses in praise of the moral virtues, yes, even in favour of religion. But what Plutarch remarked about the Stoics suits still better the rest of the unbelievers. He says, “we see ships bearing very grand names. Some are called Victory, others Courage, others Sun." For all that, they remain dependent on the winds and on the waves. Similarly, the Stoics boast of being exempt from passions, without fear, without sadness, without anger, people who are unchanging and unchangeable. In fact, they are subject to trouble, to anxiety, to rashness and other impertinences.
Theotimus, I ask you in God’s name, what virtues could those people have who deliberately and of set purpose overthrew all the laws of religion? Seneca wrote a book entitled Against Superstitions in which he criticized the impiety of unbelievers with great freedom. “This freedom," says the great St. Augustine, “was found in his writings and not in his life; since he even advised that one should reject superstition in one’s heart but one should not stop practising it in one’s actions. Here are his words: “These superstitions the sage will observe, as commanded by the laws and not as pleasing to the gods." How could they be virtuous who, as St. Augustine relates, thought “that the wise man ought to kill himself when he could not or would not any longer endure" the calamities of this life? Yet they were not willing to admit that calamities were miseries or miseries calamities. Rather they maintained that the wise man was always happy and his life full of happiness. “A happy life indeed," says St. Augustine, “to avoid which one has recourse even to death? If it is happy, why do you not remain in it?"
Then there is the one from among the Stoics and commanders who has been so much praised by the worldly-minded, for killing himself in the city of Utica in order to avoid a calamity which he considered unworthy of his life. But he did this action with so little of true virtue that, as St. Augustine says, “he did not show a courage which wished to avoid dishonour but a weak soul which did not have the confidence to face adversity." If he thought that it was a shameful thing to live under a victorious Caesar, why did he order others to trust in Caesar’s clemency? Why did he not advise his son to die with him, if death were better and more honourable than life? So, he killed himself either because he envied Caesar the glory he would have got by sparing his life or because he feared the shame of living under a conqueror whom he hated. For this he can be praised that he had a firm courage, or even perhaps a great courage, but not for being a wise, virtuous and constant person. The cruelty which is exercised without feeling and in cold blood is the most cruel of all. It is the same with despair. The one who is the most slow, the most deliberate and the most determined is also the least excusable and the most desperate.
As for Lucretia (so that we do not forget the worth of the less courageous sex!), either she was chaste under the violence and insane action of Tarquin’s son or she was not. If Lucretia was not chaste, why then is Lucretia’s chastity praised? If she was chaste and innocent on this occasion, was not Lucretia wicked to kill the innocent Lucretia? “If she was an adulteress," asks St. Augustine, “why is she so much praised? If she was chaste, why was she killed?" She dreaded the disgrace and shame from those who might think that the dishonour she had suffered through violence, while she was in life, had also been undergone voluntarily, if after she had remained in life. She was afraid that she would be considered an accomplice in the sin, if what was done to her wickedly was born by her patiently. So then, in order to escape the shame and the reproach, which depend on the opinion of people, are we to oppress the innocent and kill the just? Are we to maintain honour at the cost of virtue, and reputation at the peril of justice? Such were the virtues of the most virtuous unbelievers towards God and towards themselves.
The virtues concerning our neighbour were trodden underfoot by the unbelievers and most shamefully, by their very laws, of which the principal is piety [that is, the mutual love of parents and children]. It was Aristotle, the greatest intellect among them, who pronounced this horrible and most pitiless sentence “with regard to the exposing", that is, abandoning children to die “or bringing them up, let this be the law: none is to be cared for that lacks any member. As to other children, if the laws and customs of the city do not allow the abandoning of children, and the number of a person’s children increases to twice as many as he is able to keep, he is to anticipate the difficulty and procure an abortion.” Seneca, that wise man so much praised says, “We kill monsters; and if our children are defective, weak, abnormal or monstrous, we throw them out and abandon them.” Hence it is not without cause that Tertullian criticizes the Romans for abandoning their children to the waves, to the cold, to hunger and to the dogs. They were not forced to do so by poverty, for as he says, even the presidents and magistrates practised this unnatural cruelty. Good God, Theotimus, what sort of virtuous men were these? and what kind of wise men were these people who taught so cruel and brutal a wisdom? “Alas,” says the great Apostle, “believing to be wise they were made fools and their senseless spirit was darkened; people delivered up to a reprobate sense (Rom.1:22,21). Ah! how horrible that such a great philosopher should advise abortion. “It is murder in anticipation,” says Tertullian, “to prevent a child from being born, once it has been conceived.” St. Ambrose, condemning the non-Christians for the same barbaric practice, says, “In this way children are deprived of life before it is given to them.”
Indeed, if the unbelievers have practised some virtues, it has been mostly for the sake of worldly glory. As a result they had nothing of virtue but the action; not the motive and intention. Now virtue is not true virtue if it does not have a right intention. The Council of Orange says, “Human greed has produced the fortitude of unbelievers and Divine charity that of Christians.” “The virtues of unbelievers.” says St. Augustine, “were not true virtues but only resembled true virtues, because they were not done for a proper end but only for transitory ends.” Fabritius will receive less punishment than Cataline, not because Fabritius was good but because Cataline was worse. Not because Fabritius had genuine virtues, but because he was not so far from true virtues. So. on the day of judgement, the virtues of the unbelievers will protect them, not that they may be saved but that they may be less condemned. One vice was removed by another among the unbelievers, vices making place for one another, without leaving any for virtue. For this one single vice of vainglory they repressed avarice and many other vices. Sometimes they even despised vanity through vanity. Thus one among them who appeared to be furthest removed from vanity began trampling underfoot Plato’s well-adorned bed. Plato said to him, “What are you doing, Diogenes?" “I am trampling underfoot," he answered, “Plato’s pride." “It is true," replied Plato, “but you are trampling on it with another pride." Whether or not Seneca was vain can be gathered from his last words, since [according to Tacitus] the end crowns the work and the last hour judges all the others. What vanity, I ask you! While at the point of death, he said to his friends that he had not been able till then to thank them worthily enough. Therefore he wanted to leave them a legacy of what was most pleasant and most beautiful in himself. If they kept it carefully, they would receive great praise. He added that this magnificent legacy was nothing else than “the picture of his life". Do you see, Theotimus, how the [final] declaration of this man was foul with vanity?
It was not the love of honesty but the love of honour that moved forward these worldly wise men to the practice of virtues. Similarly, their virtues were as different from true virtues as honour from honesty, and the love of merit from the love of reward. Those who serve princes for their own interest, usually do their duties with more eagerness and greater ardour and outward show; but those who serve for love do so more nobly, more generously and hence more worthily.
The Greeks use two contrary names for carbuncles [gemstones] and rubies. They call them “pyropos" and “apyropos", that is fiery and fireless or inflamed and flame- less. They call them burning, fiery, live coals or carbuncles because they resemble fire in their glowing and splendour. They also call them fireless, or so to say uninflammable, because not only is their glow without any heat but also because they are completely incapable of receiving heat, and there is no fire that can heat them. In the same way, our early Fathers called the virtues of unbelievers virtues and non-virtues both together: virtues because they had the glow and the appearance of virtues; non-virtues not only because they did not have the vital warmth of the love of God, which alone could make them perfect, but also because they were incapable of it since they were in persons without faith. St. Augustine says, “There were in those days two Romans great in virtues, Caesar and Cato. Cato’s virtue came much closer to true virtue than Caesar’s did". St. Augustine said somewhere that “the philosophers who were destitute of true piety had shone with the light of virtue". He withdrew this statement in his book Retractations. He considered it too great praise for virtues so imperfect as those of the unbelievers. In truth, they resemble shining glow-worms which shine only during the night and lose their glow with the coming of day. Even so, these virtues of unbelievers are only virtues in comparison with vices. Compared with the virtues of true Christians they do not deserve at all the name of virtues.
Because, nevertheless, the virtues of unbelievers contain some good, they can be compared to worm-eaten apples. They have the colour [external appearance] and the little substance left to them which are as good as those of entire virtues. But the worm of vanity is in the core which spoils them. That is why whoever would use them must separate the good from the bad. I admit, Theotimus, that Cato had a certain firm courage and this firmness in him was praiseworthy. But whoever wishes to follow his example must do so in a matter that is just and right; not inflicting death on oneself but suffering it when true virtue requires it, not for the vanity of glory but for the glory of truth.
As it happened to our Martyrs who with invincible courage performed many miracles of perseverance and heroism so that the Catos, the Horatius, the Senecas, the Lucretias, the Arrias do not deserve any consideration in comparison with them. As witnesses we have the Lawrences, the Vincents, the Vitalis, the Erasmus, the Eugenes, the Sebastians, the Agathas, the Agneses, the Catherines, the Perpetuas, the Felicities, the Symphorosas, the Natalies, and a thousand thousand others. Every day I wonder at those who admire the virtues of the unbelievers, not so much because they admire unreasonably the imperfect virtues of the unbelievers, as because they do not marvel at the most perfect virtues of the Christians. Such virtues are a hundred times more worthy of admiration, and alone worthy of imitation.
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[1] St Francis de Sales speaks in this Chapter “of the virtues of pagans”. Since the word “pagan" has acquired a negative sense, we use the word “unbeliever", by which we mean “non-Christian" or “follower of other religious traditions".