WE SHOULD REDUCE THE ENTIRE PRACTICE OF VIRTUES AND OF OUR ACTIONS TO HOLY LOVE
Animals are not able to know the end of their actions. They tend indeed towards their end but do not aim at it. To aim at a thing is to tend towards it by action. Animals cast their actions towards their end but without planning. Rather, they follow their instincts without choice or intention. But man is so much master of his human and reasonable actions that he does them all for some end. Also he can direct them to one or to several particular ends as he pleases. He can change the natural end of an action, as when he swears in order to deceive someone, whereas on the contrary the purpose of an oath is to prevent deceit. He can add some other kind of end to the natural end of an action, when besides the intention of helping the poor to which almsgiving tends, he adds the intention of getting the poor person to do the same.
Sometimes we add an end that is less perfect than that of our action. Sometimes we add an end of equal or like perfection. Sometimes again we add an end that is higher and more eminent. Besides helping a person in need, to which almsgiving specially tends, one may plan: 1) to gain his friendship; 2) to give good example to one’s neighbour; 3) to please God. These are three different ends of which the first as lower than the ordinary end of almsgiving, the second not much better and the third much more excellent. As you see, we can give different perfections to our actions according to the variety of motives, ends and intentions we have in doing them.
“Be good money-changers"[1], says the Saviour! Let us take great care then, Theotimus, not to change the motives and the end of our actions except with advantage and benefit, doing nothing in this matter but with good order and reason. Consider this person who takes up an office to serve the public and to acquire honour. If his plan is more to honour himself than to serve the public good, or if he is equally desirous of both, he is wrong and continues to be an ambitious person. In fact he upsets the order of reason, equalizing or preferring his interest to the public good. But he proposes service of the public as his principal end, and is very glad along with it to promote the honour of his family, indeed one cannot blame him. Both his ends are honest and also well ordered.
Here is a person who receives Holy Communion at Easter in order not to be blamed by his neighbours and to obey God. No one doubts that he does well. But if he receives Communion to avoid blame as much as, or even more, than to obey God, who can doubt that he acts unreasonably equalizing or preferring human respect to the obedience he owes to God? I can fast during Lent either from charity in order to please God, or from the obedience because the Church commands it, or from self-denial, or from diligence in order to study better, or from prudence to make some saving that is needed, or from chastity in order to control the body, or from religion in order to pray better. If I want to, I can put together all these intentions and fast for all of them. In that case there must be good management to arrange these motives in proper order. If I fasted chiefly for savings, more than from obeying the Church or to study well rather than to please God, who does not see that I pervert right order by preferring my interest to obedience to the Church and the pleasure of my God? To fast in order to save money is good, to fast in order to obey the Church is better, to fast in order to please God is very good. Though it may seem that with three good things one cannot make an evil one, yet whoever places them in disorder, preferring the less to the better, would without doubt do something irregular deserving of blame.
A person who invites only one of his friends does not offend the others in any way. But if he invites all of them and gives the important seats to those of lower rank, placing the more honourable in the less important seats, does he not offend both groups together? He offends one group because he lowers them against reason and the other because he makes fools of them. So also when we do an action for a single reasonable motive, no matter how slight it may be, reason is not offended. But whoever wishes to have many motives, must rank them according to their quality. Otherwise he commits a sin, for disorder is a sin, just as sin is a disorder. A person who desires to please God and our Lady does very well. But one who would like to please our Lady as much as God, or more than God, would commit an intolerable disorder. One might say to him what was said to Cain: If you have offered well but have wrongly divided stop, you have sinned (Gen 4:7). We must give to each end its proper rank and therefore the supreme rank to the end of pleasing God.
Now the supreme motive of our actions, which is that of heavenly love, has this supreme property, that being more pure, it makes the actions which proceed from it more pure. The Angels and Saints in heaven therefore love absolutely nothing for any other end whatever than that of the love of the Divine Goodness and from the motive of de siring to please him. Indeed they all love one another most ardently, they love us also, they love the virtues, but all this only to please God. They seek and practise the virtues not because they are beautiful and delightful but because they are pleasing to God. They love their bliss not because they enjoy it but because it pleases God. Yes, they even love the love with which they love God, not because it is in them but because it leads to God; not because it is sweet to them but because it pleases God; not because they have and possess it but because God gives it to them and takes his good pleasure in it.
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[1] These words, not found in the Bible, are often quoted by the early Fathers as words of our Lord.