PERFECT VIRTUES ARE NEVER PRESENT SINGLY BUT ALWAYS ALONG WITH THE OTHERS
It is said [by Aristotle] that the heart is the first part of a human being to receive life by its union with the soul, and the eye the last. On the contrary, in a natural death, the eye begins the first to die and the heart the last. When the heart begins to live, before the other parts are alive, its life is certainly very feeble, frail and imperfect. But in the measure that life establishes itself more thoroughly in the rest of the body, it is also more vigorous in each part and particularly in the heart. We also see that when life is injured in any one member it is weakened in all the others. If a person’s foot or arm is hurt, all the rest is uncomfortable, affected, disturbed and upset. If we have stomach trouble, the eyes, the voice and the whole countenance are affected by it. So closely related are all the parts of a human being for the satisfaction of natural life.
All the virtues are not acquired all together in an instant, but one after another. It is in the measure that reason, which is like the soul of our heart, takes possession first of one passion then of another to control and guide them. Ordinarily this life of our soul has its beginning in the heart of our passions, which is love. Spreading itself over all the rest, it finally gives life to the understanding itself by contemplation. As, on the contrary, moral or spiritual death makes its first entry into the soul by the want of reflection (death enters by the windows says the Sacred Text: Jer. 9:21). Its final effect is to ruin good love, which once destroyed, all moral life is dead in us. So then, although we may have certain virtues separated from the others, nevertheless they can only be virtues that are weak, imperfect and frail. Reason, which is the life of our soul, is never satisfied nor at ease in a soul unless it occupies and possesses all its faculties and passions. When it is hurt and wounded in any one of our passions or affections, all the rest lose their force and vigour and grow extremely weak.
You see, Theotimus, all the virtues are virtues by the harmony or conformity they have with reason. An action cannot be called virtuous if it does not proceed from the affection which the heart has for the excellence and beauty of reason. Now if the love of reason possesses and enlivens a person, he will do all that reason requires in all circumstances, and as a result will practise all the virtues. If Jacob loved Rachel in consideration of her being Laban’s daughter, why did he despise Lea who was not only the daughter but the eldest daughter of the same Laban? But since he loved Rachel because of the beauty he found in her, he could not love equally poor Lea, though she was fruitful and sensible, because he did not find her so beautiful (Gen 29:16- 30).
Whoever loves a virtue for love of the reason and genuineness which shine in it, will love all the virtues, finding the same motive in them all. Each of them will be loved more or less, as reason appears in them more or less resplendent. One who loves generosity and does not love chastity, shows well that generosity is loved not for its beauty according to reason, because such beauty is still more radiant in chastity. Where the cause is stronger the effects should be stronger. Hence it is a clear sign that this heart is not attracted to generosity by the motive and consideration of reason. From this it follows that this generosity which seemed to be virtue is only an appearance of it, since it does not proceed from reason, the true motive of virtues, but from some other alien motive. It is quite sufficient that a child be born in marriage for it to bear in the world the name, the coat of arms and the titles of its mother’s husband. But to have the man’s blood and nature the child must be born not only in the marriage but also of the marriage. Actions have the name, the arms and the signs of the virtues, because being born of a heart endowed with reason it is presumed they are reasonable. Yet they have neither the substance nor the strength of virtues if they proceed from an alien adulterated motive, and not from reason.
It may well happen then that a person has some virtues but lacks others. But these virtues in a person will be virtues being born, still very tender, like flowers in bud. Or they will be virtues perishing, dying like fading flowers. In short, virtues cannot have their true integrity and sufficiency unless they exist all together, as all philosophy and theology assure us.
Theotimus, I ask you, what prudence can an intemperate, unjust and cowardly person have, who make choice of vice and rejects virtue? And how can one be just without being prudent, strong and temperate? In fact, justice is nothing else than a perpetual, strong and enduring will to render to everyone what belongs to him, and the science by which justice is administered is called jurisprudence. To render to everyone what belongs to him, we have to live wisely and moderately preventing the disorders of intemperance in ourselves, so as to give ourselves what belongs to us. And the word virtue, does it not signify a force and vigour belonging to the soul as a quality, even as it is said that herbs and precious stones have such and such a virtue or quality?
But prudence, is it not imprudent in an intemperate person? Fortitude without prudence, justice and temperance is not fortitude but folly. Justice is unjust in the cowardly person who does not dare to render it, in the intemperate person who lets himself be carried away by passions, and in the imprudent person who is unable to discern between right and wrong. Justice is not justice if it is not strong, prudent and temperate; nor is prudence prudence if it is not temperate, just and strong; nor is fortitude fortitude if it is not just, prudent and temperate; nor is temperance temperance if it is not prudent, strong and just. In brief, a virtue is not a perfect virtue if it is not accompanied by all the other virtues.
Theotimus, it is quite true that one cannot practise all the virtues at the same time since opportunities to do so do not present themselves all together. In fact, there are virtues which some of the greatest Saints never had the occasion to practice. For example, St. Paul, the First Hermit, what opportunity would he have for forgiving injuries or for practising courtesy, generosity, meekness? However, such persons have such great love for reason’s perfect order that, although they do not have all the virtues in fact, they have them all in desire. They are ready and prepared to follow and obey reason in all circumstances, without exception or reserve.
There are certain tendencies which are considered to be virtues and are not so. They are, in fact, gifts and graces from nature. How many persons are there who are by nature sober, simple, kind, reserved, even chaste and modest? Now all this seems to be virtue and yet not have the merit of virtue, no more than evil inclinations are blameworthy before we have given free and voluntary consent to such natural dispositions. It is no virtue to be by nature a person who eats little, but to abstain from eating by choice is truly a virtue. It is no virtue to be silent by nature, but to keep silence by reason is a true virtue.
Many people consider they have the virtues as long as they do not practise the contrary vices. One who has never been attacked can truly boast of never having run away, but not of having been brave. One who has never suffered can praise himself for not having been impatient, but not for having been patient. In the same way, many think they have virtues who, however, have only good inclinations, As these tendencies are some without others, they think it is the same with virtues.
In fact, the great St. Augustine, in a letter he wrote to St. Jerome. shows that we may have some sort of virtue without having the others, but that, nevertheless, we cannot have perfect virtues without having them all. As for vices, one may have some of them without having others. But it is impossible to have them all together. So it does not follow that one who has lost all the virtues has as a result all the vices. This is because almost every virtue has two opposite vices which are not only contrary to the virtue but also contrary to each other, one who has lost the virtue of bravery through rashness cannot at the same time have the vice of cowardice, And who has lost the virtue of generosity through extravagance cannot at the same time be blamed for stinginess.
“Catiline", says St. Augustine, “was sober, vigilant, patient in suffering cold, heat and hunger. That is why he considered himself, and so did his followers, to be a man of marvellous constancy. But this constancy or fortitude was not prudent, since he used to choose evil instead of good. It was not temperate, since he gave way to wicked actions. It was not just, since he plotted against his country. It was not therefore constancy but stubbornness which, to deceive fools, had the name of constancy".